Saddam Hussein: Master Air Strategist by Dunlap, Charles J., Jr.
Course II 
National War College 
J 
Saddam Hussein: Master Air Strategist 
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lt Col, USAF 
Seminar L
8 November 1991 
L ' . ' : ' ' -  . . . .  ~ ' : .~  : ' : '  ~ '~  " i~ ' : ' -~ 'a ! "~ "% 
SPEC~AS ' - " ' :  " : " '  .... ' :~..~.~,..:_~:.,~. ~ ~ONS 
As far  as Saddam Hussein being a great military strategist, he is neither a 
strategist, nor is he schooled in the operational arts, nor is he a tactician, nor 
is he a general, nor is he a soldier. Other than that, he's a great military 
man. 1 want you to know that. 
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf l 
One may know how to win, but cannot necessarily do so. 
Sun Tzu 2 
Fashionable thinking characterizes Saddam Hussein as the "antithesis of a strategist."3 
But, as Sun Tzu suggests, it is precipitous to draw conclusions about the caliber of a 
strategist simply because he did not prevail in a given contest. Much of the credit for 
Hussein's failure to prevail is attributed to the air campaign. What was Hussein's trategy to 
deal with over 2,600 Coalition aircraft arrayed against his force of just 750 planes? 4 
Obviously, a definitive statement of Hussein's trategic plan is not available, and one 
might never be obtainable. 5 Nonetheless, ufficient evidence xists to conclude that Hussein 
had a strategy, and one that was well-conceived given his situation. Moreover, his strategy 
was consonant with much of the thinking espoused by Sun Tzu, one of history's greatest 
theorists of military strategy. Of particular importance to U.S. planners is that Hussein's 
strategy was designed to employ American air power to achieve his objectives. Furthermore, 
some future despot might yet successfully use the strategy Hussein conceived. 
Gulf War post-mortems almost universally criticize Hussein for failing to appreciate 
the potency of Coalition airpower, and especially that of the U.S.. The evidence is, 
however, to the contrary. Former Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega spoke with Hussein 
shortly before the start of the air war. As Ortega relates the conversation, Hussein had no 
illusions: 
[W]e were talking about massive air bombardment -- strategic [against] 
economic [targets] and against he civilian populations...He said he was sure 
that if the United States wanted to, they could carry out such an air campaign 
as to destroy all the major cities in Iraq. There might even be a mill ion 
deaths. 6
Hussein had every reason to believe that the U.S. was planning such a deadly 
strategy. The former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Michael J. Dugan, announced 
in September 1990, that the air war against Iraq would be marked by "massive" attacks. He 
declared: "The cutting edge would be downtown Baghdad. This (bombing) would not be 
nibbling at the edges."7 Dugan's dismissal because of the remarks would serve to reinforce 
their strategic significance in Hussein's mind. 
Sun Tzu insists that "what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's 
strategy."8 Hussein was presented the difficult task of attacking this air strategy with an air 
force smaller and less capable than that organized against him. But again, Sun Tzu provides 
the answer: "Should one ask: 'How do I cope with a well-ordered enemy host about to attack 
me?' I reply: 'Seize something he cherishes and he will conform to your desires.'"9 What 
Americans cherish is their perception of their righteousness and humanity, of occupying the 
moral 'high ground.' If Hussein could seize -- and destroy -- this American self-image, he 
could undermine American will, and by that upset the balance of what Sun Tzu calls the 
"moral influence. "
Sun Tzu defined "moral influence" as "that which causes the people to be in harmony 
with their leaders, ''1° and believed it to be fundamental to success in war. t~ In a totalitari- 
an state such as Iraq powerful internal security apparatus ~2 can keep the populace in "har- 
mony with their leaders." Still, Hussein appreciated that the Coalition was much more 
vulnerable. In particular, Hussein believed that the Vietnam War had weakened the 
American will. He commented to Ambassador April Glaspie shortly before the occupation of 
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Kuwait that the U.S. is a "society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one bat t le .  ''13 A 
bloody conflict rivaling Vietnam could disrupt the public support necessary to maintain the 
"harmony" to which Sun Tzu refers. 
Not only did American deaths undermine public support for the Vietnam War, TM but 
enemy civilian casualties resulting from U.S. bombing did also. t5 Likewise, substantial 
civilian casualties in the Gulf War could also "send shock waves through the Arab world. ''16 
Such a reaction could further Sun Tzu's admonition to disrupt enemy alliances.17 No Arab 
government in the Coalition could have withstood the spectacle of a U.S.-led Coalition 
slaughtering Arab civilians. TM Without Arab patronage the U.S. effort would founder. 
Sun Tzu believed that to succeed at war a strategist must contrive to apply his 
strength against he enemy's weakness .  19 Hussein's great 'strength' lies in his abject cruelty 
and his freedom from public accountability. Humane and democratic societies uch as the 
United States do not seek to match such 'strengths;' they are the province of tyrants. 
Nonetheless, Sun Tzu maintains that a humanitarian and compassionate instinct is a disad- 
vantage in war. 2° Accordingly, if Hussein followed Sun Tzu's teaching he would seek to 
employ his 'strengths' to strike at the 'center of gravity' of the Coalition effort: public 
support. 
Sun Tzu asserts that "those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without bat- 
tie. ''21 Though he blustered about the "mother of all battles," Hussein's real contest was the 
struggle, as one U.S. reporter put it, for "our minds; indeed, that battle is probably as 
important to Saddam Hussein as the shooting war."22 In considering this psychological 
battle, recall that a central premise of Sun Tzu's theory is that "all warfare is based on 
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deception. ''23 Its vital corollary is the indirect approach. 24 In short, following Sun Tzu's 
conception of strategy, Hussein would not attempt to attack the powerful Coalition air 
armada directly. Instead, he would indirectly do so by somehow applying his ruthlessness 
against American,humanity with a view towards undermining American will and simulta- 
/ 
neously disrupting the Coalition alliance. 25 
The evidence indicates that Hussein developed just such a strategy. And it was as 
innovative as it was chilling: he would facilitate the American air attack on Baghdad. If 
Hussein could orchestrate the butchery of his own people by U.S. bombing, then the ensuing 
outcry would destroy American will and splinter the Coalition. Through this strategy he 
could achieve victory without fighting, which Sun Tzu believes demonstrates the "acme of 
skill. ,,26 It is the ultimate application of Sun Tzu's indirect approach. 
One of the great mysteries of the Gulf War is the poor showing of the Iraqi Air 
Force, and the flight of nearly 100 aircraft to Iran] 7 The U.S. Air Force view is that Iraqi 
pilots became convinced that they could not prevail and consequently 'opted out' of the 
war. 28 Others suggest hat Iraqi pilots were simply cowards, or that the aircraft were being 
husbanded for some future conflict. 29 But these explanations ring false. It is doubtful that 
in a military establishment as tightly controlled as that of Iraq, the systematic desertion of 
aircraft to Iran could have proceeded without Hussein's approval. 3° Further, the 'coward- 
ice' theory conflicts with a pre-war U.S. Army study 3x as well as the U.S. Air Force's own 
assessments of the pilots. 32 It is also inconsistent to suggest hat Hussein would 'husband' 
one weapons ystem while exposing so many others to decimation (such as his inventory of 
top-of-the-line T-72 tanks). There is, however, one resource Hussein has always displayed a
4 
readiness to decimate when it served his purposes -- his own people. 
The absence of the Iraqi Air Force can be explained as part of Hussein's trategy to 
attack his enemies "moral influence." In particular, it seems Hussein's trategy was to 
deliberately strip his country of their most effective air defense system in the hopes of 
attracting massive U.S. air attacks that would cause substantial civilian casualties. Sun Tzu 
suggests "enticing" the enemy "with bait,"33 For Hussein the "bait" would be Baghdad 
citizenry unprotected by Iraqi interceptors. Sun Tzu would approve of Hussein's plan to 
weaken Baghdad's air defenses: "Feign inferiority and encourage [the enemy's] arro- 
gance. ,,34 If he could make the air environment sufficiently permissive, perhaps the Ameri- 
cans could be induced to launch raids by giant B-52 bombers that would dump thousands of 
tons of high explosives into metropolitan Baghdad. 
Early in the war a few Iraqi fighters rose to meet the air attacks. This token 
opposition was the kind of deception Sun Tzu encouraged: it would mislead the Coalition as 
to Hussein's actual plan to leave Baghdad exposed. As for his army, Hussein expected they 
could safely outlast he air war 'hunkered own' inside their extensive field fortifications. 
The disappearance of the Iraqi Air Force was only part of Hussein's diabolical plan. 
For instance, although Baghdad air defenses had some fifteen minutes warning of the initial 
assault, 35 U.S. pilots found streetlights conveniently it36 -- easing their task. Certainly, 
there was ineffective missile and anti-aircraft ire, but Hussein may have concluded that the 
fire might encourage high altitude (and therefore less accurate) bombing without seriously 
threatening U.S. aircraft. 37 His purpose was not to defeat he bombing; rather, it was to 
misdirect he bombing. Every bomb that fell in a civilian area served his purpose. Addition- 
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ally, it is not without meaning that throughout the bombing campaign the civilian population 
remained in Baghdad -- despite having practiced evacuations the previous December. 38 
Hussein also mobilized the media to record the expected estruction of civilian areas. 
Presumably concluding that one correspondent could be more easily controlled, Hussein 
permitted Cable News Network (CNN) reporter Peter Arnett to remain in Baghdad for much 
of the war. With CNN's world-wide audience of more than 70 millions -- including many 
top decision makers 39 -- Hussein preserved the perfect vehicle to influence international 
opinion. Similarly, Hussein permitted former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark to visit 
Iraq. (Both Arnett and Clark claimed in subsequent reports that U.S. bombs struck civilian 
targets. 4°) 
But some in the media sensed Hussein's trategy. Time reported in its 18 February 
1991 issue: 
Saddam seems to be trying to provoke more [civilian casualties] by putting 
military installations among them -- placing anti-aircraft guns on top of 
apartment houses for example. Thus a dismal equation: more bombing equals 
more civilian deaths equals ever greater chance for Saddam to portray the war 
as an assault by Western colonialist and Zionists against he entire Arab 
world. 41 
Why then did Hussein's trategy fail? His strategy was derailed by the unforseen -- 
and perhaps unforeseeable -- applications of advanced munitions technology. Not only did 
this technology enable Coalition forces to attack Hussein's military forces with disastrous 
effectiveness, it also frustrated his hopes for high civilian casualties. Baghdad was heavily 
attacked, but only one tenth of one percent 42 of the precision-guided munitions (PGM) 
mistakenly struck civilian areas. The effect was ruinous for Hussein's plan. As Newsweek 
observed: "The relative precision of the air war deprived Saddam of a political goal: 
arousing Arab anger and sapping American will at home. ,,43 
What is more is that videos obtained from PGM targeting systems provided Coalition 
briefers with a 'weapons-eye-view' of attacks to show news-hungry audiences. The films 
repeatedly showed weapons 'zeroing-in' on distinctly military targets. As the Boston Globe 
put it: "The first images of the 43-day Persian Gulf War mesmerized most viewers: televi- 
sion pictures of targeted Iraqi bunkers and buildings, many in downtown Baghdad, being 
'surgically' destroyed by precision-guided bombs dropped from stealthy aircraft. ,,44 
When Iraqi propagandists tried to sway world sentiment with claims that a 'baby 
formula' factory had been bombed, and later claims that a mosque 45 and a civilian bomb 
shelter had been deliberately targeted, 46audiences had already been conditioned by numer- 
ous television images of pin-point accurate bombings. The world was quite prepared to 
believe that every effort was being made to strike military targets with meticulous exact- 
ness. 47 If the occasional bomb went awry, plenty of pictures of precision attacks quickly 
rebutted the notion that the Coalition was engaged in any sort of genocidal bombing 
campaign. The anticipated flood of civilian casualties simply never materialized. 
The synergistic effects of casualty-minimizing PGMs mated with the resourceful use 
of videos from their targeting mechanisms doomed Hussein's trategy. 48 The New Republic 
put it succinctly: 
Propaganda was one of Saddam's most critical weapons in this 
war, particularly propaganda that would inflame Arabs and 
thereby sunder the coalition of Americans and Arabs arrayed 
against him. If we were not tormented with pictures of carnage 
in Baghdad, it may be because there was not much carnage in 
Baghdad. 49 
Again, it should not be uncritically assumed that Hussein's trategy was suspect. 
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Even without massive civilian casualties, the mere length of the air campaign made Coalition 
members fear that Hussein would be seen "as a hero and Iraq as the victim of western 
imperialism."5° Shortly before the start of the ground war King Hussein of Jordan articulat- 
ed the very message Saddam wanted when he argued in a radio address that "The true aim 
behind this devastating war...is to return Iraq to a primitive life...This is a war on all Arabs 
and Muslims."st Similarly, American empathy was building for Iraqi "civilians trapped 
inside a nation pounded by an aerial assault hey could do nothing to prevent."s2 Fortu- 
nately for the Coalition, the war ended shortly thereafter. 
But in the next conflict time may not serve U.S. air strategists so well. The success 
the air war enjoyed in avoiding civilian casualties was much the result of the months of 
preparation that Desert Shield allowed Desert Storm. Planners had the time to devise attack 
routes and tactics that would diminish the likelihood that even misdirected bombs would 
cause civilian deaths) 3 Moreover, there was enough time to assemble the right aircraft and 
sufficient precision munitions to accomplish the military task in a manner which minimized 
the dangers to civilians. 5~ 
Future wars might not be so accommodating. 
forces are still heavily dependent on 'dumb' bombs. 
Despite the emphasis on PGMs, U.S. 
Indeed, in Desert Storm only 7.4% of 
the air-delivered ordinance was PGMs. 55 While PGMs hit their target 90% of the time, 
'dumb' bombs achieved a mere 25 % "on target" rate. 56 Nevertheless, public expectations 
have been altered -- perhaps permanently. The images of the war "created an impression of 
[a] remote, bloodless, push-button battle in which only military targets were destroyed."57 
Even though perhaps as many as 100,000 Iraqis died during the conflict, the Gulf War did 
not condition the American public to support a campaign that proffers images of thousands of 
dead human beings, even those of enemies. 58 It only conditioned them to accept -- and 
perhaps demand -- that the 'images' be of destroyed things, s9 
PGMs do limit collateral civilian casualties but they are expensive. 6°And they are 
best launched from specially-outfitted delivery platforms. 61 For example, all of the manned 
air attacks on Baghdad were conducted by sophisticated U.S. Air Force F-1 17s. 62 In 
future contingencies PGMs or appropriate air assets (or both) may not be readily available, 
particularly in an era of reduced budgets. The likeliest prospect is that vital targets will still 
need to be attacked with 'iron' bombs that lack the ability to minimize civilian casualties. 
Planners ought to ponder Sun Tzu's advice to not "put a premium on killing. "63 The 
American public may now believe that air campaigns can be conducted with relatively little 
risk to civilians. Military professionals realize that the Gulf War presented ideal circum- 
stances for the application of air-delivered PGMs. Ironically, the failure to achieve similarly 
limited civilian casualties in a future campaign might be interpreted as a deliberate attack on 
civilians. The very success of the campaign that defeated Hussein's trategy might have 
established precedents and expectations which could encumber the future application of air 
power. 
The question remains, was Hussein the "antithesis of a strategist?" Surely his failure 
to anticipate the phenomenal effectiveness of air-delivered PGMs would not rank him so. 
The success of the weapons astonished many respected experts. 64 Similarly, the ingenious 
use of videos at press briefings was nothing less than revolutionary. 65 In fact, the Air 
Force considers their use as engendering a "remarkable transformation i popular attitudes 
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toward air power. ,,66 Crystal balls are not yet on the TOA of even a master strategist. 
Sun Tzu teaches that because war is "of vital importance to the State" it must be 
thoroughly studied. ,,67 It is sometimes difficult to accept hat an abhorrent individual might 
conceive of something -- anything -- worthy of our attention. This paper has tried to suggest 
that what is submitted as Hussein's air strategy might have had some logic to it, and logic 
that is compatible with elements of Sun Tzu's theories. Quite obviously a comprehensive 
study might yield other, even contradictory conclusions. 68
Still, two points are clear: First, Sun Tzu remains relevant and useful in the high 
technology environment of modem war. Secondly, even the most loathsome adversary might 
have some evil genius within him that demands dispassionate study by military professionals. 
As to the second point Sun Tzu has a warning for us if we misjudge our defeated foe: "He 
who lacks foresight and underestimates hi enemy will surely be captured by him. ,,69 
Likewise, Shakespeare -- no strategist himself but nevertheless an uncannily accurate 
observer of the human condition -- cautions: "Tis best to weigh the enemy more mighty than 
,, 70 he seems. 
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